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INTRODUCTION. 
 
The United States has long been known as a bastion of freedom 
and a nation that readily opens its arms to those seeking refuge from 
persecution.  As emblazoned on the Statue of Liberty, “give me your 
tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.”1  This 
premise stems largely from principles considered fundamental to 
Americans, i.e. the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, among others.  Further, it has long been a 
practice that the U.S. will not return a foreign national to a country 
where that national’s life or freedom is threatened.2  The U.S. 
promotes this policy through the application of its asylum laws.3  The 
                                                 
1 EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883), reprinted in EMMA LAZARUS: 
SELECTIONS FROM HER POETRY AND PROSE 48 (Morris Schappes ed. Jewish 
Historical Society of New York 1967).  The poem was inscribed on the base of the 
Statue of Liberty in 1903. 
2 Ruth Ellen Wasem, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Immigration Policy on 
Asylum Seekers, May 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32621.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).   
3 Asylum is the process by which the United States grants lawful presence to a 
refugee fleeing a foreign country due to persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.  An alien 
who successfully demonstrates that he or she has faced past persecution in a foreign 
216 
1
Floss: Seeking Asylum in a Hostile System: The Seventh Circuit Reverses
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
United States’ commitment to these principles and its ubiquitous 
reputation and stance as the land of the free has long provided 
persecuted aliens the opportunity to start life anew.   
 What is the result then, if the ability of aliens fleeing from 
genuine persecution becomes endangered in administrative 
blundering, ignorance, incompetence, or perhaps political posturing?  
Does this begin to taint our history as an oasis for persecuted refugees?  
Or is it necessary to rethink and reform our long held status as a 
sanctuary for the persecuted in light of the dangers a relatively open 
door policy can pose in the post-9/11 era?   
The answers to these questions are complex and may differ 
amongst political ideologies, but what remains certain is that there 
exists a fundamental problem in the area of immigration adjudication, 
and in particular, asylum adjudication.  The number of asylum 
adjudication cases appealed to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals from 
the government agencies charged with adjudicating such cases has 
risen sharply in the past several years.4  In and of itself, a rise in the 
number of appeals to the federal courts poses little problem other than 
an increased burden on judicial resources.  However, the troubling 
aspect of these appeals, and a further indication of a fundamental and 
underlying problem, is the unusually high rate at which aliens’ 
petitions to review are granted and federal agencies’ decisions are 
thereby reversed.5  For example, in the period between June 15, 2005 
and December 15, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit granted the alien’s petition for review in 
approximately two-thirds (19 of 29) of the published opinions that 
                                                                                                                   
country or likely would face future persecution if returned to that country is 
protected and immune from extradition to the country from which he or she has fled.  
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).   
4 U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA 
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr. 
26, 2006).  “The rate of new petitions — the number of BIA decisions appealed to 
the Federal courts compared to the total number of BIA decisions — has increased 
from an historical 5 percent (before 2002) to a current [December 8, 2004] level of 
approximately 25 percent.”  Id.   
5 See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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dealt with asylum denial issues.6  What is the source of this high rate 
of reversal and what can be done to remedy it?  How are the Seventh 
Circuit and the U.S. Government responding to the problems 
identified?   
This Comment will explore some of the problems inherent in the 
immigration adjudication system identified throughout opinions issued 
by the Seventh Circuit between June 15, 2005 and December 15, 2005.  
Part I introduces the basics of the asylum adjudication process.  Part II 
addresses the unusually high rate of reversal seen in recent Seventh 
Circuit decisions.  Part III explores several of the most common flaws 
identified in immigration judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, particularly credibility determinations and 
corroboration requirements, and explores potential remedies to these 
problems.  Part IV discusses several procedural problems created by 
federal agencies that have helped contribute to the high rate of 
reversals.  In addition, this Comment explores the role the Seventh 
Circuit is playing in effectuating change in the system of asylum 
                                                 
6 Cases in which the petition was granted: Kllokoqi v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 336 
(7th Cir. 2005); Durgac v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2005); Lhanzom v. 
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005); Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 
2005); Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2005); Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 
F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2005); Tapiero de Orejeula v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 
2005); Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2005); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 
421 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2005); Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2005); Hor 
v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2005); Haile v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 
2005); Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2005); Chen v. Gonzales, 420 
F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2005); Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2005); Sahi v. 
Gonzales 416 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2005); Mohideen v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 567 (7th 
Cir. 2005); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005); Fessehaye v. 
Gonzales, 414 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2005) 
Cases in which the petition was denied: Djouma v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 685 (7th 
Cir. 2005); Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 2005); Hussain v. 
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2005); Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598 (7th 
Cir. 2005); Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2005) (petition denied on 
jurisdictional grounds); Mitreva v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2005); Singh v. 
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2005); Hernandez-Baena v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 
720 (7th Cir. 2005); Li v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2005); Hysi v. Gonzales, 
411 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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application adjudications and in the context of immigration 
adjudication as a whole.   
 
I. THE ASYLUM ADJUDICATION PROCESS:BACKGROUND AND 
PROCEDURE. 
 
A. A Brief Introduction to the Asylum Process. 
 
Asylum is typically thought of as governmental protection and 
immunity from extradition or deportation granted to a political refugee 
fleeing from a foreign country.  The process of applying for asylum in 
the United States, although not overly complicated, can be an arduous 
and often frustrating experience for those seeking such protection.  In 
order to adequately address the issues that are currently contributing to 
the high rate of reversal amongst administrative asylum decisions, a 
brief overview of the asylum procedure is necessary.   
There are several means by which an alien may attempt to gain 
lawful status within the United States as an asylee.7  The context in 
which an alien applies for asylum differs depending on that particular 
alien’s legal status within the U.S, whether present legally or illegally.  
Given this status, the alien will apply through either an agency of the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) known as United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) or through the 
                                                 
7 “An asylum application can arise in three contexts: (1) an affirmative 
application, in which a noncitizen in valid nonimmigrant status applies for asylum 
with the . . . USCIS; (2) a defensive application filed with an immigration judge (IJ) 
in response to action taken against the noncitizen; and (3) in response to expedited 
removal proceedings.”  3-34 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN 
YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 34.02 (2006).  If an alien 
applies for asylum with the USCIS, an officer of the USCIS shall perform an initial 
interview with the alien to determine if the alien has a ‘credible fear’ of persecution.  
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1996).  Should the USCIS determine that 
the alien does have a credible fear of persecution, the alien’s asylum application will 
be referred to the DOJ immigration court for a hearing on the matter.  8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(B).  Note also that should the officer determine that there is no ‘credible 
fear’ of persecution, an alien is entitled to prompt review by an IJ.  8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).   
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Immigration Court of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
administered by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).8  Regardless of 
the manner in which asylum is sought, unless an alien’s asylum 
application is granted, that application will at some point be 
adjudicated in a hearing in front of an immigration judge or IJ.9  At 
this hearing, an IJ “evaluates an alien’s claim for credibility, assessing 
internal consistency, plausibility, and detail,”10 and may require the 
alien to provide corroborating evidence in certain circumstances.11   
To qualify for asylum, an alien bears the burden of demonstrating 
that he or she is a refugee that is unable or unwilling to return to his or 
her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear 
of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.12  If an 
alien is able to demonstrate past persecution, this gives rise to a 
rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.13   
The IJ will either grant or deny asylum and will render a written 
decision addressing the merits of the alien’s claim.  If asylum is denied 
by the IJ, the alien may appeal the decision to the BIA, which serves 
as the appellate entity of the Immigration Court.  This appellate Board 
is made up of eleven members appointed by the Attorney General,14 
although temporary Board members may be added for periods not to 
exceed six months.15   
                                                 
8 See 3-34 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 34.02 (2006).   
9 Id.   
10 Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Capric v. 
Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1085 (7th Cir. 2004)).   
11 See Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Uwase v. 
Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 
969 (7th Cir. 2003).  See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000) (stating “[t]he testimony 
of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without 
corroboration.”)).   
12 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
13 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).   
14 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2005).   
15 Id. at § 1003.1(a)(4).   
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Under a ‘streamlining’ regulation enacted in 2002 by former 
Attorney General John Ashcroft,16 a single BIA member is authorized 
to affirm an IJ’s decision without issuing an opinion if that Board 
member determines that the underlying result was correct, that any 
errors in the decision were harmless or nonmaterial, and that either (1) 
the issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board or 
federal court precedent and do not involve the application of precedent 
to a novel factual situation, or (2) the factual and legal issues raised on 
appeal are not so substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a 
written opinion in the case.17  If the Board member determines that 
one of these two conditions is not met, a three-member Board panel 
will then review the application.18  The Board panel may then reverse 
the lower decision and issue an opinion of its own, affirm the decision 
without issuing an opinion, or affirm the decision with an amended or 
new opinion.19
 
B. Judicial Review by the Federal Courts of Appeals. 
 
If the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision with its own opinion or amends 
the opinion of the IJ, the alien may appeal the BIA’s decision to the 
federal court of appeals having jurisdiction over the alien.20  A federal 
circuit court reviews this decision under the deferential “substantial 
                                                 
16 U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA 
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr. 
26, 2006).  
17 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i).  Note also that “[A] decision to streamline does 
not mean that the BIA has adopted, or entirely approves of, the IJ’s determinations; 
it only means that the BIA deemed any errors by the IJ to be harmless.”  Hamdan v. 
Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1058 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 
350 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2003)).     
18 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6).   
19 Id. at § 1003.1(d)-(e).   
20 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005).  See also 8-104 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY 
MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 
104.05, 104.13 (2006).   
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evidence” standard21 in which the decision “must be affirmed if it is 
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the 
record considered as a whole.”22  Substantial evidence is more than a 
“mere scintilla” or “uncorroborated hearsay;” “it means such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”23  Therefore, a court will grant a petition for review only 
if the alien appellant “shows that ‘the evidence not only supports 
[reversal of the BIA’s decision], but compels it.’”24  In addition, an 
asylum grant is ultimately a discretionary decision by the Attorney 
General.25
If the BIA affirms an IJ’s ruling without opinion, the court 
reviews the decision of the IJ directly,26 again applying the substantial 
evidence test, reversing only if the evidence compels a different 
result.27  The IJ’s opinion must be supported by “specific, cogent 
reasons . . . [that] bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.”28   
The Seventh Circuit has stated that under this standard, “outright 
reversal is almost never called for.  More commonly, petitions for 
review will be granted when the court concludes that there is more that 
                                                 
21 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).   
22 Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).   
23 Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. 
denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949), reh. denied, 339 U.S. 945 (1950) (citing Consolidated 
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1838)).   
24 Liu, 380 F.3d at 312 (quoting Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1).   
25 Asylum applications sometimes are denied in the exercise of discretion, even 
if the alien has established a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of 
the five statutory grounds.  3-33 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN 
YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.05 (2006).   
26 Durgac v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Soumahoro 
v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2005); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 
(7th Cir. 2004).  
27 Durgac, 430 F.3d at 851; see also Mitreva v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 761, 764 
(7th Cir. 2005); Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2004).  
28 Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nasseri v. 
Moschorak, 34 F.3d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Fisher 
v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
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must be done at the agency level before final conclusion on an asylum 
application is possible.”29  Thus, although an “IJ’s credibility 
determination is entitled to great deference,”30 a court “will not 
automatically yield to the IJ’s conclusions when they are drawn from 
insufficient or incomplete evidence.”31  As will be shown, 
insufficiently supported adverse credibility determinations represent a 
major source of errors identified in asylum decisions reviewed by the 
Seventh Circuit.   
 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT:   
REVERSE, REVERSE, REVERSE. 
 
Given the deferential substantial evidence standard of review 
applied by the federal courts, one might speculate that the Seventh 
Circuit would rarely grant an alien’s petition for review, and would 
outright reverse the decision of the IJ or BIA in even fewer 
instances.32  Surprisingly, this assumption is decidedly off base.  As 
noted previously, during its last term, the Seventh Circuit granted the 
alien’s petition for review in approximately two-thirds of its published 
opinions concerning asylum.33  Even more troubling is the fact that 
this alarmingly high rate of reversal applies not only to asylum 
decisions, but extends to all immigration decisions rendered by 
immigration adjudicators.  For example, the Seventh Circuit recently 
noted: 
 
                                                 
29 Durgac, 430 F.3d at 851-852.   
30 Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing see Uwase v. 
Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 2003)).   
31 Dong, 421 F.3d at 578 (citing Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 968 (7th 
Cir. 2003)).   
32 The Seventh Circuit has noted that under the substantial deference standard, 
credibility determinations “should only be overturned under extraordinary 
circumstances.”  Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Nasir v. 
INS, 122 F.3d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1997)).     
33 See supra note 6.   
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In the year ending [September 23, 2005], different 
panels of this court reversed the [BIA] in whole or part 
in a staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review 
the Board that were resolved on the merits.  The 
corresponding figure, for the 82 civil cases during this 
period in which the United States was the appellee, was 
18 percent.34   
 
However, the high reversal rate alone does not complete the story.  
Accompanying these reversals has been scathing critique of the 
analyses, methods employed, and conclusions formed by the 
underlying immigration adjudicators.  A sampling of a recent Seventh 
Circuit decision provides but a small snippet of the varying critiques 
leveled upon the IJ or BIA: 
 
[o]ur criticisms of the Board and of the immigration 
judges have frequently been severe . . . “the 
[immigration judge’s] opinion is riddled with 
inappropriate and extraneous comments” . . . “this very 
significant mistake suggests that the Board was not 
aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s] case” . 
. . “the procedure that the [immigration judge] 
employed in this case is an affront to [petitioner’s] right 
to be heard”) . . . the immigration judge’s factual 
conclusion is “totally unsupported by the record” . . . 
the immigration judge’s unexplained conclusion is 
“hard to take seriously” . . . “there is a gaping hole in 
the reasoning of the board and the immigration judge” . 
. . “the elementary principles of administrative law, the 
rules of logic, and common sense seem to have eluded 
the Board in this as in other cases.”35  
 
                                                 
34 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).   
35 Id. (citations omitted).   
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This type of biting criticism has continued beyond those decisions 
of the Seventh Circuit’s past term, thus indicating that the problem is 
persistent and fundamentally ingrained in the system.36  Nor is the 
Seventh Circuit alone in rendering harsh criticism upon IJs and the 
BIA.  In Benslimane v. Gonzales the Court cites language from the 
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits:   
 
[o]ther circuits have been as critical . . . “the tone, the 
tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the 
[immigration judge] seem more appropriate to a court 
television show than a federal court proceeding” . . . the 
immigration judge’s finding is “grounded solely on 
speculation and conjecture” . . . the immigration judge’s 
“hostile” and “extraordinarily abusive” conduct toward 
petitioner “by itself would require a rejection of his 
credibility finding” . . . “the [immigration judge’s] 
assessment of Petitioner’s credibility was skewed by 
prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and 
conjecture” . . . “it is the [immigration judge’s] 
conclusion, not [the petitioner’s] testimony, that ‘strains 
credulity’”.37
 
Obviously the system is flawed and the Seventh Circuit has 
chosen to voice its rising indignation on this matter in a manner that 
has received growing publicity of late.38  The criticism seems 
                                                 
36For example, in Cecaj v. Gonzales the court stated: 
    The immigration judge’s analysis of the evidence was 
radically deficient.  He failed to consider the evidence as a whole, 
as he was required to do by the elementary principles of 
administrative law.  [citations omitted]  Instead he broke it into 
fragments.  Suppose you saw someone holding a jar, and you said, 
“That’s a nice jar,” and he smashed it to smithereens and said, 
“No, it’s not a jar.”  That is what the immigration judge did.   
440 F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2006).     
37 Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829.   
38 Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1.   
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warranted as well.  An adjudicative body that is reversed in nearly 
two-thirds of its appeals represents an affront to the rights of those 
seeking protection in its courts.  This is particularly true given that the 
high rate of reversals in the Seventh Circuit has taken place under the 
application of the deferential substantial evidence standard of review.  
But what is the root cause for this judicial breakdown?  And is the 
system really as flawed as the Seventh Circuit claims it to be?   
  
III. COMMON ERRORS IN IJ AND BIA ANALYSES. 
 
Despite the sometimes scathing and often pointed critiques by the 
Seventh Circuit, the majority of the asylum reversals issued by the 
Court in its last term can be attributed to one or both of two issues that 
form the crux of nearly every asylum claim analysis; (1) a credibility 
assessment of the alien’s testimony as well as any accompanying 
evidence presented and, (2) the imposition of a corroborating evidence 
requirement on an otherwise credible alien.  The immigration 
adjudicator must support decisions regarding these issues with 
substantial evidence gleaned from the record as a whole.39  Yet, as 
identified by the Seventh Circuit, this is often not the case.     
 
A. Is the Asylum Claim Credible? 
 
During an asylum hearing an immigration judge will assess the 
credibility of the alien applicant, as well as the credibility of any 
accompanying witnesses, experts, and other evidence.  DHS counsel 
will cross-examine the applicant, and the IJ may also question the 
alien.  An interpreter, whether provided by the alien or by the DOJ, 
will almost always be present.  An IJ will then, based on all the 
available evidence, determine whether the alien’s claim of persecution 
is credible or incredible.40  Credibility determinations “must be 
                                                 
39 Millar v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1530, 1540 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (stating that an 
agency’s conclusions must be based on record as a whole).   
40 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2005).   
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supported by specific, cogent reasons.”41  In addition, any reason cited 
by an immigration judge must “bear a legitimate nexus to the 
finding.”42  Credibility determinations in asylum claims are often 
dispositive, and are primarily based upon subjective analysis.43  As 
such, these determinations are particularly prone to abuse and 
erroneous conclusions.   
 
1. Grasping at Minor Inconsistencies. 
 
Assessing the credibility of an alien claiming past or future 
persecution in a foreign country requires an astute judge of character.  
In a majority of cases, an alien has little or no supporting 
documentation due to the circumstances under which the alien left his 
or her respective country.  Much of an IJ’s analysis will thus be 
predicated upon the testimony of an alien and accompanying 
witnesses, if any.  To add to the difficulty of this process, it is 
inevitable that an IJ will be presented with fraudulent claims of 
persecution on a somewhat regular basis given the benefits a grant of 
asylum bestows.  Yet, as an adjudicator, it is the responsibility of an IJ 
to sift through the testimony and discern that which is truthful and that 
which is false.  The Seventh Circuit understands the gravity of this 
task, but insists that far too often immigration judges and the BIA 
cling to minor inconsistencies that have no bearing on the overall 
validity of the asylum claim.44
For example, in Lhanzom v. Gonzales the Seventh Circuit recently 
chastised the analysis of an IJ’s adverse credibility determination as 
fraught with findings of inconsistent testimony from the alien that in 
                                                 
41 Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999).   
42 Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2005).   
43 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2005).    
44 Lhanzom, 430 F.3d at 848 (citing Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 386-
87 (7th Cir. 2004) to criticize the increasing reliance by the BIA and IJs upon 
perceived inconsistencies in testimony as the basis for adverse credibility 
determinations, even in cases where the alleged discrepancies are minor or easily 
explained).     
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fact did not exist.45  Here, an alien who sought asylum supplemented 
her claim through the testimony of her father, a seventy-nine-year-old 
Tibetan man.46  Throughout the father’s lengthy examination by the 
immigration judge there appears in the record many instances of 
miscommunication between the witness and the IJ; 
miscommunications which the IJ deemed to represent 
inconsistencies.47  The Court noted that the immigration judge 
responded with “unusual defensiveness” when the alien’s attorney 
attempted to correct those misunderstandings.48  The alien’s father 
acknowledged that much of his testimony was based upon matters for 
which he had little personal knowledge and he was simply relaying 
what he had heard, yet the IJ based much of his incredibility decision 
on internal inconsistencies between the testimony of the alien’s father 
and the account of the alien herself.49  In fact, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that “the IJ did not comment on [the alien’s] demeanor as a 
witness but relied entirely on these alleged inconsistencies in finding 
her not credible.”50  The Court further stated that “in reviewing the 
transcript of [the alien’s father’s] testimony, again, the only thing that 
is clear is the level of confusion during his testimony as the IJ 
continued to question him about matters for which he had no personal 
knowledge.”51  In granting the petition for review, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the “IJ’s conclusion is based on an assumption and 
assumption cannot form the basis of impeachment.”52   
                                                 
45 See Lhanzom, 430 F.3d 833.   
46 Id. at 837-39.     
47 Id.    
48 Id. at 837.    
49 Id. at 844-45.     
50 Id. at 843.   
51 Id. at 845.  Moreover, the Court lamented the “frequent insensitivity in 
immigration hearings to the possibilities of misunderstandings caused by the use of 
translators of difficult languages such as Chinese.  Id. (citing Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales, 
400 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2005)).   
52 Lhanzom, 430 F.3d at 846 (citing Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377, 383 
(7th Cir. 2004)).   
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This case represents a mounting concern of the Seventh Circuit 
that IJs and the BIA have increasingly grasped onto “perceived 
inconsistencies” in testimony as the basis for incredibility 
determinations, even where such inconsistencies are immaterial and 
could be readily explained.53  In an overzealous effort to weed out 
fraudulent claims from those with merit, or perhaps responding to 
internal pressure from the executive branch of the government, 
immigration adjudicators have scrutinized the record looking for gaps 
and latent ambiguities instead of looking at the overall plausibility of 
an alien’s claim.54  This type of error was prevalent in the asylum 
decisions reviewed by the Seventh Circuit during its last term.55   
This problem has been created by the DHS and the DOJ 
themselves.  As the number of immigration appeals rises,56 
immigration adjudicators presumably need to cut corners at an 
                                                 
53 Lhanzom, 430 F.3d at 848 (citing Korniejew, 371 F.3d at 386-87).   
54 Since 9/11, the rate at which asylum has been granted by the United States 
has dropped.  In 2000, about forty-four percent of asylum cases were granted, in 
2003 only twenty-nine percent of asylum cases were granted.  Eleanor Acer, Refuge 
in an Insecure Time: Seeking Asylum in the Post-9/11 United States, 28 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1361, 1384 (2005); see also Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How 
Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1190 
(2004) (discussing Mar. 18, 2003 press conference of Secretary of Department of 
Homeland Security Tom Ridge introducing Operation Liberty Shield, a transcript of 
which is available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=525 (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2006)).  From the context of this briefing, there seems to be a government 
presumption against the validity of asylum claims.     
55 See, e.g., Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Ssali v. 
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2005); Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 
2005); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2005); Dong v. Gonzales, 
421 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2005); Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2005).   
56 “The expanded streamlining procedures have allowed the BIA to allocate its 
limited resources to adjudicate more than 40,000 new appeals and other matters filed 
annually, and to steadily reduce its pending caseload from 56,000 in August 2002 to 
approximately 33,000 by October 2004.”  U.S. Department of Justice: Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, BIA Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, 
(Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr. 
26, 2006).    
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increased rate.  With the enactment of the streamlining policy, 
discussed in more depth below, the number of cases reviewed by a 
BIA panel has sharply dropped.57  The result is less scrutiny given to 
adverse credibility determinations based on perceived inconsistencies; 
culminating in a breakdown or at least a dilution of the appellate 
process.  A procedural change in the immigration adjudication process 
is necessary to combat this problem unless the level of analysis 
provided by IJs begins to increase across the board.  However, the 
proposition of an increased quality of analysis provided by IJs is 
unlikely to come to fruition without a major increase in training and 
resources, particularly since immigration adjudication error stems 
from a variety of sources.   
 
2. Do Cultural Bias, Indifference, or Unjust Skepticism  
Factor Into Asylum Adjudications? 
 
An alternative problem in credibility assessments is the lack of 
cultural awareness exhibited by many IJs and the BIA.  The Seventh 
Circuit recently noted that the “lack of familiarity with relevant 
foreign cultures” evidenced in immigration cases was “disturbing.”58  
This problem is almost exclusively isolated to the arena of asylum 
adjudication.  Each decision in an asylum case has the distinction of 
being generally unique from all other asylum cases.  An alien’s 
application is based on the particular circumstances surrounding that 
alien’s life as seen through his or her own eyes.  Though many aspects 
of asylum cases may be similar, particularly when aliens are seeking 
asylum from the same country, the factors incumbent to an alien’s 
claim for asylum, such as his or her ethnicity, religion, political or 
social beliefs, and the varying degrees of persecution that a particular 
alien has been subjected to, are highly individualized and ensure that 
no two stories will be exactly the same.  Moreover, conditions in 
countries from which aliens seek asylum continually change as 
governments rise and fall and popular opinions sway.  This state of 
                                                 
57 Id.   
58 Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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perpetual flux poses difficulties for an immigration judge in assessing 
the validity of an asylum claim.  For instance, stare decisis will rarely 
be invoked unless an asylum application and country conditions 
essentially mirror that of a prior opinion.  In addition, an IJ must 
attempt to accurately determine the state of the conditions in the 
country the alien is fleeing both at the time of alleged past persecution 
and at a future time should the alien be returned to that country.59   
Despite all of these issues, an immigration judge and the BIA are 
still representatives of the judiciary and must behave accordingly to 
preserve our notions of justice and judicial impartiality.  Therefore, it 
is incumbent upon each immigration adjudicator to approach each 
asylum case without preconceived notions of proper behavior or 
mannerisms without sufficient and reliable knowledge of an 
applicant’s culture, ethnicity, and religion among other factors, and the 
geopolitical state of affairs in the country from which that alien is 
fleeing.  This must be done in order to correctly assess the inherent 
plausibility of that applicant’s asylum claim.  Although it may seem 
natural to believe that IJs and the BIA are continually mindful of these 
factors in processing asylum claims, recent opinions of the Seventh 
Circuit prove otherwise.   
In Tabaku v. Gonzales, a Christian church driver did not report a 
rape and murder he had witnessed after his life had been threatened in 
the same incident.  One of the grounds relied upon by the immigration 
judge in a finding of adverse credibility was the conclusion that a 
Christian had a moral and legal obligation to report the incidents, and 
that some sort of record would thus have been formed.60  Since the 
alien was unable to provide documentation to support this story, this 
became a factor in the IJ’s finding of adverse credibility.  The Seventh 
Circuit admonished the IJ for substituting the IJ’s own concept of what 
it means to be a Christian, an impermissible error, and also noted that 
crimes continually go unreported when a witness’ slife is endangered 
even in the United States.61   
                                                 
59 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2005); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).  
60 Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2005).      
61 Id. 
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This type of error calls into question the level of influence 
subjective determinations made by immigration judges should warrant 
in credibility assessments.  As shown by the high rate of reversals, the 
substitution of cultural contexts often leads to conclusions 
inappropriate under the circumstances the alien faced.  This 
consequently deprives aliens of fair and impartial analyses of their 
applications.62  Yet, aside from advising the judge to leave behind any 
preconceived notions of cultural decorum, the options to remedy this 
problem are few.  Each case may represent an entirely different 
cultural context than the last and it can hardly be expected of an IJ or 
the BIA to become a veritable expert in every culture that comes 
before their court.  Nor can it realistically be expected of any 
adjudicator to approach a case with an entirely blank slate.63  What the 
Seventh Circuit seems to be advocating however, is that an IJ or the 
BIA take sufficient time to acquaint themselves with the relevant 
culture, discern the societal differences from United States’ culture 
inherent to that culture, and make an unbiased and good faith 
credibility assessment applying those principles.  However, without 
any further stimulus from the DHS and the DOJ, agencies not 
particularly responsive to lobbying on behalf of aliens, the Seventh 
Circuit may have to suffice for wishful thinking and the generation of 
recurring criticism in its opinions.   
In addition to cultural bias, skepticism, although a healthy 
moderator of truth at certain times, has also become prevalent in 
asylum adjudication, at times unjustly.  Perhaps there is a rational 
basis for this given that there are certainly a multitude of fabricated 
stories thrust upon IJs on a routine basis.  Or perhaps it has more to do 
with political ideologies that disfavor immigrants and asylum seekers 
                                                 
62 “Fact-finders in the United States, blinded by their particular world-views, 
often expect other cultures to operate by familiar rules and reject information that 
does not conform to those expectations.  This type of expectation colors the way 
fact-finders receive and evaluate asylum seekers’ testimony.”  Carla Pike, The 
Human Condition and Universality in Credibility Determinations: How Cultural 
Assumptions Skew Asylum Decisions, 10-10 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2005).   
63 Id.  (suggesting that immigration judges should receive training on their own 
cultural biases and how these biases effect their assessment of asylum claims).   
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following 9/11.64  Regardless of its origin, the Seventh Circuit has 
held that unwarranted skepticism is not sufficient for an adverse 
credibility determination and that the record must substantiate any 
skepticism at all.65   
In Dong v. Gonzales, a Chinese alien testified that four village 
officials came to her house upon learning she was pregnant, and 
coerced her into going to the hospital.66  Upon arriving at the hospital 
the alien was subject to an abortion despite her pleas that she wanted 
to keep her child.67  The immigration judge doubted whether four 
government officials would actually have traveled to the alien’s 
house.68  In granting the alien’s petition for review, the Seventh Circuit 
responded that “[t]here is nothing in the record that affirmatively 
supports the IJ’s assumption that village officials would not act as [the 
alien] described.  The IJ’s skepticism alone, in light of [the alien’s] 
consistent testimony, does not support a negative credibility 
determination.”69   
Regardless of the underlying reason behind such skepticism, the 
fact remains that there are many honest applicants who have suffered 
horrific atrocities and who should not be subjected to warrantless 
skepticism.  The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that immigration 
judges must be mindful of their appointments as adjudicators and that 
by allowing any cynical dismissal of an alien’s claim to enter into their 
judgment they consequently ignore the responsibilities incumbent to 
that role.70  As such, skepticism, though perhaps warranted in a 
number of cases, must be amply supported and tempered with an open 
mind.   
                                                 
64 See Tumlin, supra note 54, at 1190.   
65 Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 2005). 
66 Id. at 575.   
67 Id.   
68 Id. at 578.   
69 Id. (citations omitted).   
70 See Dong, 421 F.3d 573; see also Shtaro v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 711, 715 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he IJ points to no evidence to support [the IJ’s] assumptions about 
the motivations of [the alien’s] alleged persecutors, and [the alien’s] story is not so 
inherently improbable that we can uphold the IJ’s decision without such evidence.”).   
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It is difficult to discern precisely whether the tendency to be 
overly skeptical stems solely from the cultural backgrounds of IJs, or 
if it is also a product of governmental policy.  It is no secret that the 
government has recently sought to curb high levels of immigration, 
particularly since 9/11.71  Regardless of the root, the DOJ and DHS are 
the sole entities that can force immigration adjudicators to give a bit 
more credence to alien testimony.     
 
3. Congress Creates New Standards for Credibility Assessments. 
 
Congress recently enacted legislation that revised the standards by 
which immigration judges reach credibility determinations in asylum 
adjudications.72  Perhaps this was an effort to remedy the large number 
of erroneous or unfounded immigration judge credibility assessments.  
However, under the newly enacted provisions, a grant of asylum may 
be much more difficult to obtain.  The REAL ID Act of 2005 provides 
the following basis upon which credibility should be determined:    
 
(iii) Credibility determination. -- Considering the 
totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a 
trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the 
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or 
witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or 
witness’s account, the consistency between the 
applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements 
(whenever made and whether or not under oath, and 
considering the circumstances under which the 
statements were made), the internal consistency of each 
such statement, the consistency of such statements with 
other evidence of record (including the reports of the 
Department of State on country conditions), and any 
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without 
                                                 
71 See supra note 54. 
72 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 
§ 101 (2005).   
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regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or 
falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or 
any other relevant factor.  There is no presumption of 
credibility, however, if no adverse credibility 
determination is explicitly made, the applicant or 
witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of 
credibility on appeal.73
 
However, this particular amendment of the Act took effect on May 11, 
2005 and applies solely to applications for asylum made on or after 
that date.74  
It may be possible that a more clearly delineated credibility 
assessment standard may help reduce the number of asylum reversals 
granted by the federal courts.  However, the standard promulgated 
under the REAL ID Act greatly enlarges the authority of an IJ to rule 
adversely on the credibility of an alien, under conditions the Seventh 
Circuit has disapproved of in its recent opinions.75  Moreover, the 
REAL ID Act did not expressly address the standard of review 
applicable to credibility determinations.76  Therefore, the Seventh 
Circuit and other circuit courts will continue to review credibility 
determinations assessed under the new standards by application of the 
substantial evidence standard requiring support by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a 
                                                 
73 Id. (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005)).   
74 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(h)(2).  See 
also Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2005).  The opinions of the 
Seventh Circuit issued within the applicable time period this Comment addresses do 
not apply this new standard; the adjudication, and accompanying review, of asylum 
applications often may take several years before a final administrative order is 
reached.   
75 See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).  
See also Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005); Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 
371 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 2004).   
76 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).   
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whole.77  Indeed, the passage of this new standard may produce 
unanticipated problems further complicating the credibility 
determination process and resulting in little progress towards the 
reduction of circuit court reversals.   
 
4.  Will the REAL ID Act of 2005 Benefit or Impair  
Credibility Assessments? 
 
There has been, and continues to be, a substantial amount of 
opposition to the enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005 from a large 
variety of sources, particularly the provisions concerning asylum 
applicants.78  Initially, the language concerning credibility 
determinations performed by IJs has drawn serious ire from 
opponents.79  The most troublesome language under the Act will allow 
an immigration judge to base an asylum credibility determination on 
the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness.80  
Although normally beneficial in the general civil or criminal hearing 
context, using these criteria is problematic in the asylum arena.   
Demeanor is a highly cultural phenomenon and is a highly 
subjective determination.  An evaluation of demeanor may be no more 
than an exercise in contrasting cultures.  It essentially pits the cultural 
background of the IJ, established as the norm, against the background 
of the alien.  This propensity to transpose may be based on the 
ingrained human tendency to perceive things based on our own 
experiences and point of view.81  One can hardly fault immigration 
judges for being human.  But the responsibilities of an IJ, like almost 
                                                 
77 Id.  See also Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting INS 
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).   
78 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).  See 
also Human Rights First, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/realid/pdf/sign-
on-letter-042105.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006) (Apr. 21, 2005 letter to Congress 
signed by over 80 organizations and 80 individuals opposing Section 101 of the 
REAL ID Act of 2005).   
79 Id.   
80 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005).   
81 Pike, supra note 62, at 2.   
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no other legal profession, require a worldly perspective on cultural 
differences.  What may seem to be irrational behavior based on U.S. 
standards may be entirely appropriate given the circumstances and 
conditions concurrent in the country from which an alien is fleeing.  
To then gauge an alien’s credibility based on his or her demeanor in 
such a context unfairly creates bias against that alien.  For example, 
refraining from making eye contact may represent a sign of respect 
and submission to authority in some cultures, wherein the U.S. an 
immigration judge may perceive an avoidance of eye contact as an 
indication that an alien is being untruthful.82   
In addition, emotions can often play a large factor in credibility 
assessments performed by IJs, yet they may often be misleading.  In 
asylum claims, an alien may often be forced to discuss horrible 
traumas perpetrated upon themselves and their families.  It is not 
uncommon, and in most cases the norm, to encounter stories of 
beatings, rape, and murder.  One might expect highly emotional 
testimony exhibited by an alien when discussing such incidents, yet 
this is not always the case.  “Torture victims often have what mental 
health professionals call a ‘blank affect’ when recounting their 
experiences, a demeanor that an adjudicator might misinterpret as 
demonstrating lack of credibility.”83  Even in the presence of a judge, 
aliens, and humans in general, deal with emotional issues in different 
ways; some may break down in sorrow at a hearing while others may 
contain their emotions inside as a coping mechanism.  An IJ that is 
indifferent, aloof, skeptical, or perhaps even biased against these 
differences can have a profound effect on an alien’s ability to freely 
discuss the events surrounding that alien’s asylum claim.  This, in turn, 
can unfairly result in an adverse credibility determination due to the 
alien’s demeanor, candor, or responsiveness under the new credibility 
                                                 
82 Human Rights First, REAL ID Endangers People Fleeing Persecution, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum_10_sensenbr.asp (last visited Apr. 
26, 2006).   
83 Amnesty International U.S.A., The REAL ID Act of 2005 and Its Negative 
Impact on Asylum Seekers, Mar. 2005,  
http://www.amnestyusa.org/uspolicy/pdf/realid_0305.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 
2006).    
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standards.  This may produce erroneous conclusions as to the 
credibility of an alien or his or her witnesses.  When reviewing 
decisions using these standards in the future, the Seventh Circuit may 
use some skepticism of its own.   
The REAL ID Act may also increase the prevalence of 
immigration adjudication error concerning adverse credibility 
determinations based on minor inconsistencies.84  The amended 
language allows immigration judges and the BIA to base an adverse 
credibility determination on any inconsistencies, regardless of whether 
they go to “the heart of the applicant’s claim.”85  Consider this new 
standard in the context of Lhanzom.86  The inconsistencies between 
the father’s testimony and that of the alien, which arose primarily from 
the father’s confusion and miscommunication with the IJ, would be a 
suitable basis for an adverse credibility finding under the REAL ID 
Act language.87  This conclusion seems to be a particularly harsh 
result and may clash with the Seventh Circuit’s notion of fairness in 
asylum adjudications.88   
Cultural bias and erroneously subjective analyses of immigration 
judges in credibility assessments already has become a veritable, 
recurring cornerstone of immigration reversals, rearing their heads in 
decisions such as Dong, Tabaku, and Lhanzom.89  Therefore, 
                                                 
84 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).   
85 Id. (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005)).   
86 Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833, 837-39 (7th Cir. 2005).   
87 See Lhanzom, 430 F.3d at 837-39.  REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).   
88 The Seventh Circuit has also reversed cased concerning material 
inconsistencies upon discovering that the inconsistencies are not inconsistencies at 
all.  See Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2005) (In which both an IJ 
and the BIA mistakenly thought that an alien was from an entirely different part of 
his respective country, a location in which membership in the alien’s political group 
would be unlikely and would pose no danger.  Yet, the alien actually hailed from the 
opposite side of the country, which supported his claim.  The Court noted that this 
represented a “very significant mistake” which “suggests the Board was not aware of 
the most basic facts of [the alien’s] case.”).   
89 Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2005); Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 
F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005).   
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application of new standards under the REAL ID Act will serve only 
to exacerbate the current credibility assessment problems the Seventh 
Circuit is forced to address through its reversals.90  Thus, it stands to 
reason that the Court’s high reversal rate in asylum petitions will 
continue until the government addresses the problem from within.   
The problems recently noted by the Seventh Circuit, reliance on 
minor inconsistencies, cultural bias or indifference, and unjust 
skepticism among others, can only be addressed organically by the 
DHS and DOJ.  The Seventh Circuit can reverse and not so subtly hint 
at what can be done to remedy these problems, but Congress and the 
agencies themselves are ultimately responsible for changing 
procedures and policies.  Perhaps this was the goal when the new 
credibility standards were recently enacted.  Yet, the new language 
includes highly subjective terms and may actually result in asylum 
adjudications becoming more susceptible to the problems addressed.  
Although the agencies may have meant to alleviate error in credibility 
assessments, substantially increased subjective leeway given to asylum 
adjudicators is not the answer the Seventh Circuit had in mind.  In 
order to comport with the Seventh Circuit’s decisions, asylum 
adjudicators should be given less subjective sway in asylum decisions.   
 
 
 
 
B. When May an Immigration Adjudicator Require an Alien to 
Provide Corroborating Evidence? 
 
1. Is an Alien’s Credible Testimony Alone 
Sufficient for an Asylum Grant? 
 
                                                 
90 “[T]he natural tendency of the asylum provisions of the REAL ID Act will 
likely be to provide statutory cover for shoddy decision-making.”  Acer, supra note 
54 at 1393.   
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As noted previously, credibility determinations play a vital role in 
the success of an asylum application.91  Yet, intertwined with 
credibility is the concept of corroboration.  In certain circumstances an 
immigration judge or the BIA may require an alien to produce 
evidence in addition to his or her own testimony which corroborates 
the alien’s claim of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.92   
The Seventh Circuit has often held that a credible asylum 
applicant need not provide corroborating evidence in order to meet his 
or her burden of proof.93  Indeed, the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 
208.13(a) provides that “the testimony of the applicant, if credible, 
may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without 
corroboration.”94  However, the BIA has not been quite as lenient in its 
interpretation.  The BIA has interpreted the regulatory language above 
as permitting an immigration judge to require corroboration from an 
alien deemed credible in situations “where it is reasonable to expect 
corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the 
specifics of an applicant’s claim.”95  The Seventh Circuit, however, 
has been uncomfortable with an imposed requirement of corroborating 
evidence when an alien is otherwise credible, even when such 
imposition is discretionary, and has reversed IJ decisions that have 
denied a credible alien’s asylum claim solely because that alien could 
not provide corroborating documents.96   
Choosing to invest more credence in the testimony of alien 
applicants, the Seventh Circuit has held that “corroborating evidence is 
essential to bolster an otherwise unconvincing case, but when an 
                                                 
91 See supra Part III.A.     
92 Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2005).   
93 Id.   
94 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000).   
95 Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612 (citing In re S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725 
(B.I.A. 1997)).   
96 Id. (citing see Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir. 2005); Lin v. 
Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir. 2004); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 695 
(7th Cir. 2004); Ememe v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 2004); Uwase v. 
Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 2003)).   
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asylum applicant does testify credibly,97 it is not necessary for [the 
alien] to submit corroborating evidence in order to sustain [the alien’s] 
burden of proof.”98  In order to deny asylum relief for lack of 
corroborating evidence, an immigration judge must: (1) make an 
explicit credibility finding; (2) explain why additional corroboration is 
reasonable; and, (3) explain why the alien’s explanation for not 
producing the requested corroboration is inadequate.99   
The Seventh Circuit has also taken notice that the federal circuit 
courts have split on their application of corroboration requirements; 
the Ninth Circuit dispensing of any corroboration requirement once 
credible testimony has been established and the Second, Third, Sixth, 
and Eight Circuits essentially deferring to the BIA’s position that an 
alien may be required to submit corroborating evidence even after a 
favorable credibility determination has been made.100  Yet, while the 
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) is applicable to 
its decisions reviewed for this Comment, this split has become moot as 
applied to future asylum adjudications given the enactment of the 
REAL ID Act.101   
 
2. Congress Creates New Standards for the Requirement of 
Corroborating Evidence.   
 
                                                 
97 Credible testimony defined as testimony that is “specific, detailed, and 
convincing.”  Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2005).   
98 Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Uwase, 349 F.3d 
at 1041).  “The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain 
the burden of proof without corroboration.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2000).   
99 Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Gontcharova v. 
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 
945, 951 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
100 Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 613 (citing Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 
2000); see also Dorosh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 379, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2004); El-Sheikh 
v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 
551 (3d. Cir. 2001); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2000)).   
101 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).     
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Congress addressed situations in which an immigration 
adjudicator may require an alien to provide corroborating evidence 
through the enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005.102  Specifically, 
the Act provides that a requirement of corroboration necessary to 
supplement testimony is to be assessed as follows: 
 
(ii)  Sustaining burden. -- The testimony of the 
applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s 
burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant 
satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is 
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts 
sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.  
In determining whether the applicant has met the 
applicant’s burden, the trier of fact may weigh the 
credible testimony along with other evidence of record.  
Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant 
should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise 
credible testimony, such evidence must be provided 
unless the applicant does not have the evidence and 
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.103   
 
However, similar to the amendments to credibility assessments 
addressed above in Part III.A.3, the amendments addressing 
corroboration requirements applies solely to asylum applications made 
on or after May 11, 2005.104   
The amended language which allows an adjudicator to impose a 
requirement of corroborating evidence on a credible alien, albeit when 
evidence is reasonably available, is incongruent with the Seventh 
Circuit’s previous standard that an otherwise credible alien may not be 
                                                 
102 Id.       
103 Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2005).   
104 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(h)(2) 
(2005).  Therefore, recent opinions of the Seventh Circuit have not reviewed 
decisions subject to the new standards.     
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forced to provide corroborating evidence.105  Thus, although utilizing 
the new burden of proof test for corroborating evidence may lead to a 
reduction in the number of reversals issued by the Seventh Circuit 
concerning corroboration, this will simply be because the Seventh 
Circuit must acquiesce to the statutory language, not because it agrees 
with the imposition of a corroborating evidence requirement on an 
otherwise credible alien.  The new standard of sustaining burden 
mirrors the aforementioned position of the BIA,106 and prior decisions 
of the Seventh Circuit have demonstrated its disapproval of the BIA’s 
position and the subsequent outcomes rendered in the application of 
this position.107
An alternative provision of the REAL ID Act amends the standard 
of review to be applied by federal circuit courts when assessing an 
imposed requirement of corroborating evidence.108  In contrast to the 
provision above, the language amending the standard of review 
became immediately applicable to all asylum adjudications in which a 
final administrative order has been issued.109  The amended section 
provides that “[n]o court shall reverse a determination made by a trier 
of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . . . 
unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to 
conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”110   
                                                 
105 Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612 (holding that a credible asylum applicant need not 
provide corroborating evidence in order to meet his or her burden of proof).   
106 Id.,(citing In re S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725 (BIA 1997); see also In re 
M-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1183-84 (B.I.A. 1998)).   
107 Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612 (citing Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 810 (7th 
Cir. 2005); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir. 2004); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 
381 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2004); Ememe v. Ashcroft¸ 358 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 
2004); Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 2003)).   
108 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(e) (2005) 
(codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2005)).      
109 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(h)(3) 
(2005).   
110 Id. at § 101(e) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)).  This section of the Act 
applies “to all cases in which the final administrative removal order is or was issued 
before, on, or after [May 11, 2005],” thus providing for express retroactive 
application of the Act.  Id.   
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This language does not significantly differ from the substantial 
evidence standard normally employed by the circuit courts and should 
not significantly alter the level of scrutiny applied.111  However, the 
new standard of review does provide the Seventh Circuit and other 
circuit courts with some ability to limit impositions of corroborating 
evidence requirements on credible aliens, albeit only to the extent that 
the reviewing court finds that such corroborating evidence would be 
unavailable.112  Pity the credible alien who leaves behind available 
evidence.   
 
3. Will the REAL ID Act of 2005 Allow Fair Application of 
Corroboration Requirements?   
 
As noted, the new language concerning an alien’s burden stands in 
contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s prior tenet that credible aliens need 
not supply corroborating evidence.113  The Seventh Circuit’s position 
may stem from the logical premise that if an alien has provided 
testimony that an adjudicator deems credible, it is unnecessary and 
perhaps unfair to require more from that alien.114  In addition, recent 
opinions of the Seventh Circuit have identified many of the same types 
of subjectivity problems in corroboration requirements as those found 
                                                 
111 Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. 
Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9th Cir. 1949) cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949), reh. 
denied, 339 U.S. 945 (1950) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229-230 (1838)). 
112 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(e) (2005) 
(codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2005)).    
113 Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
credible asylum applicant need not provide corroborating evidence in order to meet 
his or her burden of proof).   
114 “The BIA’s rule unfairly casts the asylum applicant as ‘guilty until proven 
innocent’ in her efforts to establish a claim for which she has already provided 
credible, unrefuted, direct, and specific testimony.”  3-34 CHARLES GORDON, 
STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 
§ 34.02 (2006).   
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in credibility assessments.115  Both the standard of review and burden 
of proof tests are premised on the interpretation of what is reasonable 
and when evidence is obtainable or available.116  These are subjective 
tests that remain susceptible to the same criticisms of bias, 
indifference, or ignorance applicable to credibility determinations.  
Although the amended standard of review language may enable the 
Seventh Circuit and other reviewing courts to remedy some of these 
issues, several recent Seventh Circuit decisions exemplify the 
problems inherent in applying the new standards.   
In Hor v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit’s concern with cultural 
bias is noticeably pronounced.117  Here, an alien sought to escape an 
Islamic guerrilla movement engaged in civil war against the Algerian 
government.118  The alien was nearly executed by the guerillas, 
escaping only after police shot and killed two of the assailants.119  The 
IJ, in holding that corroborating evidence was available and could 
have been obtained, criticized the alien’s failure to provide newspaper 
articles or affidavits from his co-workers and his inability to 
corroborate the story of a roadblock and ensuing gun battle with any 
paperwork.120  The Seventh Circuit noted that the IJ failed to take into 
account that Algeria was a military dictatorship with a state run 
media.121  Nor did the IJ take into account the probability that the 
acquaintances of the alien still located within Algeria would not want 
to go on public record describing the actions of the guerillas;122 to 
make this assumption implies the IJ did not view the availability of the 
                                                 
115 See Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2005); Hor v. Gonzales, 
421 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2005); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005).   
116 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).   
117 Hor, 421 F.3d 497. 
118 Id. at 498-500.   
119 Id. at 499.   
120 Id. at 499-501.   
121 Id. at 500-501.   
122 See Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997) (Rosenberg, Board 
Member, concurring).   
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evidence from the perspective of the alien.  In granting the petition for 
review, the Court stated: 
 
[t]he notion that documentation is as regular, 
multicopied, and ubiquitous in disordered nations as in 
the United States, a notion that crops up frequently in 
decisions by immigration judges . . . is unrealistic 
concerning conditions actually prevailing in the Third 
World.  To be entitled to deference, a determination of 
availability must rest on more than implausible 
assertion backed up by no facts.123   
 
In another example exemplifying the dangers of subjectivity and 
bias inherent in the corroboration requirement, the alien in Soumahoro 
v. Gonzales sought to provide the IJ with corroborating documents 
such as a birth certificate, national identification card, newspaper 
articles, and official letters that had been airmailed to the United States 
by a friend of the alien still located within the alien’s former country 
of Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast).124  The outbreak of war delayed the 
shipment and the package was originally shipped to the wrong address 
(the alien provided a copy of the incorrect mailing airbill).125  The IJ 
came to the puzzling conclusion that the alien had arranged for an 
empty box to be sent to himself in order to delay his proceedings.126  
The immigration judge denied a request by the alien’s attorney for a 
continuance until the documents could arrive and subsequently held a 
hearing in which asylum was denied (the package containing the 
documents arrived two days later).127  This clearly represented a 
situation in which it was unreasonable for the IJ to require the 
                                                 
123 Hor, 421 F.3d at 501 (citing Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 534 (7th 
Cir. 2005); Gontcharova v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877-78 (7th Cir. 2003); Muhur 
v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 959-60 (7th Cir. 2004); Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 
123, 134 (3d Cir. 2003); Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
124 Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2005).   
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 735. 
127 Id.   
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corroborating documents at the time of the original hearing, 
particularly when the alien’s reason for not producing the documents 
on time was much more plausible than that provided by the IJ.128   
In yet another recent opinion, both cultural differences and 
immigration judge bias factor into an erroneous denial due to an 
alien’s failure to provide sufficient corroborating evidence.129  In 
Galicia v. Gonzales, an alien asserted that the Guatemalan government 
had persecuted her and that her husband was a dissident who had been 
murdered.130  In an effort to corroborate her claim, she attempted to 
enter into the record the testimony of two experts, only to have the 
immigration judge deny such testimony citing time constraints.131  In 
addition, the IJ also held that the alien’s lack of evidence corroborating 
the registration of a car allegedly owned by the alien found near her 
husband’s body adversely affected her credibility.132   
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with this analysis, holding that the 
refusal of the court to hear the expert testimony represented a denial of 
due process, that the experts could have provided corroborating 
testimony, and that the IJ’s reliance on the lack of evidence 
corroborating the car registration failed because it was irrelevant to the 
issues the alien presented.133  Echoing the language of the amended 
standard of review, the Court held that “a reasonable trier of fact 
[would be] compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence 
was unavailable.”134  Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has previously 
held that “corroboration should be required only as to ‘material 
facts’.”135  Thus, the registration of a car located near the alien’s 
recently murdered husband did not constitute a material fact, was 
                                                 
128 Id. at 737.   
129 See Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2005).   
130 Id.     
131 Id. at 533.     
132 Id. at 537.    
133 Id. at 537-39.   
134 Id. at 538.   
135 Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 502 (7th Cir. 2004).   
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irrelevant to the issues, and would have provided little corroboration 
towards the relevant issues.136   
This case demonstrates the dangers inherent in allowing the 
applications of otherwise credible aliens to be denied based solely on 
the subjective test of when corroborating evidence is available and 
when it is reasonable to require such evidence.  The IJ may substitute 
his or her own notions concerning the availability of paperwork and 
other evidence in countries across the world that the IJ may know little 
or nothing about.  Further, and even more grievous, an immigration 
judge may show simple bias in the application of “subjective” tests, 
such as the exclusion of the alien’s corroborating experts do to “time 
constraints” as witnessed in Galicia.137    
Similar to problems identified in credibility determinations, the 
Seventh Circuit seems to believe errors commonly arise when 
adjudicators substitute their own experiences, or perhaps expectations, 
for that of the alien.138  In other words, the IJ doesnot consider the 
circumstances under which a particular alien has been forced to depart 
his or her country.  An IJ, or any individual living in the U.S., has an 
expectation that should someone be injured, harassed, or killed, 
records will be readily accessible and available.  Such a person expects 
almost every type of record to be available, whether it be birth 
certificates, death certificates, arrest records, hospital records, or 
anything of the like.  Yet, as the Seventh Circuit has noted: 
 
[m]any asylum applicants flee their home countries 
under circumstances of great urgency.  Some are 
literally running for their lives and have to abandon 
their families, friends, jobs, and material possessions 
without a word of explanation.  They often have 
nothing but the shirts on their backs when they arrive in 
                                                 
136 See Galicia, 422 F.3d at 537.  
137 Id. at 533.  In addition, the immigration judge in this proceeding imposed a 
strict time limit concerning the testimony of the alien herself, which prevented her 
from introducing the testimony of her expert witnesses.  Id. at 539.   
138 Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2005).   
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the country.  To expect these individuals to stop and 
collect dossiers of paperwork before fleeing is both 
unrealistic and strikingly insensitive to the harrowing 
conditions they face.139   
 
Under the prevailing standards, it is entirely possible for an 
otherwise credible alien, one who has provided specific, detailed, and 
persuasive testimony, to be denied asylum if that alien is unable to 
provide corroborating evidence if an IJ deems that such evidence is 
available.140  The Seventh Circuit has consistently disapproved of the 
BIA position congruent with the prevailing standard.141  The 
imposition of such a requirement has been likened to a request for a 
note of persecution from an alien’s persecutors.142  However, a safety 
valve of sorts lies in the newly promulgated standard of review that 
allows a court to overturn erroneous corroboration requirements if “a 
reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such 
corroborating evidence is unavailable.”143  Yet, this “safety valve” 
does little to benefit a credible alien that has failed to obtain 
presumably available evidence.   
Ultimately, the decision to amend the corroborating evidence 
language and allow the imposition of a corroboration requirement 
despite credible testimony represents the resolution of the federal 
government to provide immigration adjudicators greater latitude in 
which to deny asylum applicants.  The new language under which both 
corroboration and credibility are assessed provides adjudicators 
increased authority to deny asylum applications under a wider variety 
of factors.  Yet, the Seventh Circuit has recently called immigration 
adjudicators to task for their subpar analysis on both credibility 
                                                 
139 Id. (citing see Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 502 (7th Cir. 2004)).   
140 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2005).  
141 Dawoud, 424 F.3d at 612 (citing see Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 810 
(7th Cir. 2005); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 756 (7th Cir. 2004); Diallo v. 
Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2004); Ememe v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 446, 453 
(7th Cir. 2004); Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 2003)).   
142 See Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2000).    
143 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(e) (2005).   
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assessments and corroboration requirements.144  This misalignment 
certainly will not solve the problem of high immigration petition 
reversal.  Given the Seventh Circuit’s disapproval of a hard and fast 
corroboration requirement that may be imposed regardless of 
credibility, and the seemingly cavalier application of the corroboration 
requirement by IJs and the BIA as evidenced in recent Seventh Circuit 
opinions, it is likely that the Seventh Circuit will attempt to make full 
use of the amended standard of review requiring that corroborating 
evidence be “available” in order to protect asylum applicants against 
erroneous and unsound asylum denials.   
 
C. Are State Department Reports Being Used as a Crutch? 
 
Each year, the United States Department of State issues a report 
for every country that assesses and critiques the human rights situation 
in that country during the prior year.145  These reports often provide an 
extensive reference guide to human rights abuses, frequently citing 
specific and often graphic examples.146  Thus, these reports seem to 
provide a solid basis upon which immigration judges may begin to 
familiarize themselves in order to fairly adjudicate asylum claims from 
a particular country.  However, it seems that IJs have often ended their 
research at this stage as they have been reprimanded by the Seventh 
Circuit and other circuit courts of appeals for their continued over-
reliance on State Department country reports.147  Yet, the lack of 
otherwise verifiable information concerning conditions inside many of 
the oppressive countries from which alien applicants are fleeing makes 
                                                 
144 See Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Lhanzom v. 
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005); Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 
2005); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005). 
145 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,  
March 8, 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61551.htm 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2006).   
146 Id.   
147 See, e.g., Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798, 807-08 (7th Cir. 2005); Shah v. 
INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000); El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 
204 (1st Cir. 2003).  
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it almost certain that these country reports become the yardstick 
against which the credibility of an alien’s claim is measured.  In 
addition, IJs may feel that they are entitled to rely on such documents 
given that federal regulations permit such reliance, although 
information from other agencies and sources may be submitted as 
well.148   
Yet, as noted, the Seventh Circuit seems to believe that 
immigration adjudicators defer too often and too quickly to the 
information provided in these reports, thus using the reports as a 
veritable crutch upon which the support of the adjudicator’s decision 
relies.149  The problem is that an alien may often disagree with some 
or many of the findings asserted in the anonymously compiled country 
reports, and he or she is left with little or no recourse to challenge 
those findings.150  The Seventh Circuit recently voiced its concern 
with an over reliance on country reports in Koval v. Gonzales, noting:    
 
State Department country reports are anonymous in 
their authorship.  Decision-makers in the asylum 
determination process do not know the identity of the 
author, the credentials of the individuals who assemble 
the reports, or the trustworthiness of the evidence upon 
which the assessments contained in these reports are 
based . . . As we have noted previously, the country 
reports are prepared in general terms and offer more of 
a statement on the relationship of the United States 
Government to that country than an account of 
individual circumstances.151
                                                 
148 An “asylum officer may rely on material provided by the Department of 
State.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2000).   
149 See Koval, 418 F.3d at 807-08.   
150 “Nothing in this part shall be construed to entitle the applicant to conduct 
discovery directed toward the records, officers, agents, or employees of the Service, 
the Department of Justice, or the Department of State.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.12(b).   
151 Koval, 418 F.3d at 807 (citing Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 
2000) (noting that country reports are “brief and general, and may fail to identify 
specific, perhaps local, dangers to particular, perhaps obscure, individuals”); see also 
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 In Koval, an alien sought asylum from Ukraine due to her 
membership in the Mormon Church.152  The alien attempted to 
provide expert testimony from several sources, including a former 
KGB agent whom had been based in Ukraine and had been assigned to 
a department that monitored the daily activities of the churches in the 
Soviet Union.153   The former agent stated that, although he had not 
returned to Ukraine in 12 years, he had maintained his contacts with 
sources developed in the KGB and that at the time of the hearing he 
currently worked for the United States Government on security issues 
relating to Russia and Ukraine.154  The immigration judge excluded 
the testimony of the former KGB agent, asserting that he was not a 
qualified expert regarding the treatment of Mormons in Ukraine, 
particularly since he had not traveled to Ukraine in 12 years.155  In 
denying the asylum application, the IJ based his conclusion 
substantially on the State Department country reports that, in his view, 
did not indicate severe mistreatment of Mormons in Ukraine.156  In 
reversing the decision, the Seventh Circuit noted: 
 
[the former KGB agent’s] testimony, had it been 
considered, would have placed [an excerpt from the 
country report] in a very different light than the one in 
which it was placed by the IJ . . . The exclusion of his 
testimony was improper; it prevented the petitioners 
from showing that the broad assertions of the country 
report were indeed subject to qualification – a 
                                                                                                                   
El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 204 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that country 
reports should be used for purposes of providing “context and generalized credibility 
assessment”)).   
152 Koval, 418 F.3d at 800-03.   
153 Id. at 802. 
154 Id. at 802-03.   
155 Id. at 803.   
156 Id. at 807.   
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qualification that might well have made a difference in 
this case.157    
 
In order to prevent this type of bias in the utilization of these reports, 
the Seventh Circuit recommended that immigration adjudicators take 
into account both the “practical limitations of these reports and the 
practical limitations on asylum applicants to present other expert 
testimony and other evidence to rebut the ipse dixit assertions of the 
reports.”158   
The prevention of such bias and over reliance is critical in 
situations such as this in which an alien is forced to challenge or 
contest the assertions of a government-sponsored report in front of a 
government-sponsored adjudicatory body.  The cards are often not 
stacked in the alien’s favor.  The Seventh Circuit recognizes the 
dangers in this type of reliance and its opinions have clashed with the 
regulation allowing such reliance,159 often simply pointing out the 
plausibility of the alien’s claim in spite of, and in the context of, the 
country reports.  Yet it seems that the Seventh Circuit is swimming 
upstream in its criticism of such reliance; the new credibility standards 
enacted under the REAL ID Act of 2005 expressly allow an 
immigration judge to base credibility determinations upon the 
consistency of statements with other evidence of record “including the 
reports of the Department of State on country conditions.”160  Here 
again, as with credibility and corroboration, a common error in 
adjudicative procedure noted by the Seventh Circuit has been codified 
as acceptable in contravention of the Court’s notion of fair and 
impartial adjudication.  However, it seems doubtful that the Seventh 
Circuit will simply acquiesce to asylum denials relying solely or 
irrationally upon Department of State country reports.  To that end, the 
Court may restrain the use of these reports by holding that the 
                                                 
157 Id. at 808.     
158 Id. 
159 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (2000).  See also Koval, 418 F.3d at 807.   
160 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101(e) (2005). 
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conjecture often contained in such reports is not a substitute for 
substantial evidence.161   
 
IV. SHOULD BLAME LIE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE? 
 
A. Immigration Judges are Given Little Guidance. 
 
Notwithstanding the problems identified above, it may be unfair 
to assume that all fault lies squarely on immigration judges or the BIA.  
There are a host of other factors that may play roles responsible for the 
high level of reversals issued by the circuit courts of appeals.  Despite 
all of its criticism, the Seventh Circuit is not entirely without empathy 
for the plight of IJs.  In the recent decision Djouma v. Gonzales, the 
Seventh Circuit opined that the DHS and the DOJ have failed to 
provide IJs with systematic guidance as to resolving credibility issues, 
and indeed have done little to address problems in these 
assessments;162 problems which leave the Seventh Circuit with little 
recourse short of reversals and the granting of petitions for review.163  
                                                 
161 “We will not permit the BIA to use either its own or the State Department’s 
conjecture to deem a person not credible.  ‘Because conjecture is not a substitute for 
substantial evidence, we cannot uphold this finding.’”  Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 
1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 1996)).   
162 “The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for the consideration of 
asylum applications filed under subsection (a).”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(1) (2005).   
163 In Djouma v. Gonzales the Seventh Circuit noted: 
 We understand the dilemma facing immigration judges in asylum 
cases.  The applicant for asylum normally bases his claim almost 
entirely on his own testimony, and it is extremely difficult for the 
judge to determine whether the testimony is accurate.  Often it is 
given through a translator, and even if the applicant testifies in 
English, as a foreigner his demeanor will be difficult for the 
immigration judge to “read” as an aid to determining the 
applicant’s credibility.  Unfortunately, the [DHS] and the [DOJ], 
which share responsibility for processing asylum claims, have, so 
far as appears, failed to provide the immigration judges and the 
members of the [BIA] with any systematic guidance on the 
resolution of credibility issues in these cases.  The departments 
have not conducted studies of patterns of true and false 
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The lack of a clearly defined protocol thus leads to uncertainty in the 
adjudicative process for prospective alien applicants,164 which in turn 
may force an alien to file for as many forms of relief as possible given 
that he or she may be unable to determine the merits of a particular 
claim of relief.  This adds additional adjudications to already 
overcrowded immigration court dockets, thus compounding and 
contributing to the problems already exposed within the system.  In an 
effort to relieve the burden of overcrowded immigration dockets, the 
DOJ recently undertook a major procedure renovation addressed 
below.  However, the DOJ and DHS have to date failed to incorporate 
Seventh Circuit recommendations on improving the asylum 
adjudication system such as those outlined in Djouma, in which the 
Court suggested the need for a more clearly delineated protocol to be 
utilized in investigating cultural phenomena and characteristics 
                                                                                                                   
representations made by such applicants, of sources of 
corroboration and refutation, or of the actual consequences to 
asylum applicants who are denied asylum and removed to the 
country that they claim will persecute them.  Without such 
systematic evidence (which the State Department’s country reports 
on human rights violations, though useful, do not provide), 
immigration judges are likely to continue grasping at straws--
minor contradictions that prove nothing, absence of documents that 
may in fact be unavailable in the applicant’s country or to an 
asylum applicant, and patterns of behavior that would indeed be 
anomalous in the conditions prevailing in the United States but 
may not be in Third World countries--in an effort to avoid giving 
all asylum applicants a free pass.  The departments seem 
committed to case by case adjudication in circumstances in which 
a lack of background knowledge denies the adjudicators the 
cultural competence required to make reliable determinations of 
credibility. 
429 F.3d 685, 687-88 (7th Cir. 2005).    
164 “There are significant variations in the rate at which immigration judges 
grant asylum - from court to court, and from judge to judge within the same court - 
requiring better quality assurance and administrative review.”  Human Rights First, 
New Report From U.S. Religious Freedom Commission Exposes Barriers Facing 
Refugees (February 8, 2005), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005_alerts/asy_0208_relig.htm (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2006).   
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pertinent to asylum applicant countries as well as the need for follow-
up assessments on the actual consequences of asylum applicants who 
have been returned to their respective countries subsequent to asylum 
denials.165   
    
B. The Fateful Decision to Streamline 
 
In 2002, then acting Attorney General John Ashcroft finalized the 
implementation of a ‘streamlining’ procedure into BIA protocol.166  
According to the DOJ, the regulations promulgated under the 
streamlining amendments were “designed to address extensive 
backlogs and lengthy delays . . . [t]he new procedures enabled the BIA 
to reduce delays in the administrative review process, eliminate the 
existing backlog of cases, and focus more attention and resources on 
those cases presenting significant issues for resolution.”167   
Under the modified procedures a single member of the BIA will 
initially review an appealed IJ asylum decision in order to determine if 
a three-member panel should review the decision.168  If review is 
warranted, a panel shall review the decision and may then reverse the 
IJ decision, affirm the decision without opinion, or the panel may 
affirm the decision with an amended or new opinion.169  The single 
Board member who initially reviews the IJ decision may also affirm 
the lower opinion without review if that Board member believes it was 
correctly decided, although the regulations make clear that this “does 
not necessarily imply approval of all of the reasoning of that decision, 
but does signify the Board’s conclusion that any errors in the decision 
of the immigration judge or the Service were harmless or 
                                                 
165 See Djouma, 429 F.3d at 687-88.     
166 See U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
BIA Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr. 
26, 2006). 
167 Id.   
168 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2005).   
169 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2005).   
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nonmaterial.”170  In addition, the streamlining regulation decreased the 
number of Board members from 23 to 11 in number.171
Critics quickly responded to the new regulations by challenging 
their constitutionality concerning due process of law in federal courts, 
although each federal circuit court has held that the restructuring 
regulation is valid and does not violate due process standards.172  
Despite these setbacks, opponents of the new regulations have 
continued to voice their concerns and much of their criticism possesses 
validity which may yet force the DOJ to critically analyze the merits 
of the new streamlining procedure.173   
Initially, the decision to reduce the number of BIA members has 
been criticized as political in nature.  Several critics believe that the 
Attorney General simply removed the Board members most likely to 
disagree with his position on immigration issues and that this, in turn, 
undermined the independence of the remaining Board members.174  
                                                 
170 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2005).   
171 Id. at § 1003.1(a).   
172 U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA 
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr. 
26, 2006) (noting that federal circuit courts have denied challenges to the 
streamlining regulation).  The Seventh Circuit has passed on the issue of whether 
streamlining is constitutional, that is, whether due process is denied to an alien when 
a single Board member affirms a denial as opposed to a BIA panel.  See Hamdan v. 
Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (7th Cir. 2005).  It was unnecessary to determine 
this issue since an affirmance without opinion of an IJ’s decision issued by a single 
Board member becomes the final decision of the BIA, and the Court reviews all final 
BIA asylum decisions under the same standard of review.  Id. at 1058.   
173 See John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why 
Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in 
Federal Court?  An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 
20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 29-30 (2005) (noting “[a]part from legal challenges, 
however, criticism of the procedural changes continues to be voiced loudly by 
lawyers, scholars, members of Congress, and even by IJs and a former Board 
member.”).   
174 John R. B. Palmer, The Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 11-2 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2006) (citing see Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (2006); Peter J. 
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This position is supported by DOJ supplemental language 
accompanying the regulation which purports that uniformity in 
decisions was a goal of the new regulation.175  It stands to reason that 
this uniformity does not favor the positions brought by alien asylum 
applicants.176  Yet, the unintended, or perhaps implicitly intended, 
effect of the streamlining procedure has been a stark increase in the 
number of BIA decisions appealed to the federal courts.177  While the 
dockets of the BIA have decreased under the new regulations,178 the 
number of petitions filed with the federal courts has sharply 
increased.179  “The rate of new petitions – the number of BIA 
decisions appealed to the Federal courts compared to the total number 
of BIA decisions – has increased from an [sic] historical 5 percent 
(before 2002) to a current [December 8, 2004] level of approximately 
25 percent.”180  The result of the streamlining procedure has simply 
                                                                                                                   
Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate 
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154 (2004)).   
175 John R. B. Palmer, The Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 11-2 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2006) (citing Board of Immigration 
Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 
54,894 (Aug. 26, 2002)).   
176 “In endorsing the removal of [the 12 Board members removed under the 
regulations], the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies, which 
advocates significant restrictions on immigration, observed that ‘Board members 
should clearly represent the attorney general’s views, since they are carrying out his 
responsibility.’”  Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States 
Post-September 11, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323, 357 (2005) (citing Ricardo 
Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked to Leave; 
Critics Call It a ‘Purge’, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A16.).   
177 U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA 
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr. 
26, 2006).   
178 Id.  (noting “[t]he expanded streamlining procedures have allowed the BIA 
to allocate its limited resources to adjudicate more than 40,000 new appeals and 
other matters filed annually, and to steadily reduce its pending caseload from 56,000 
in August 2002 to approximately 33,000 by October 2004.”).   
179 Id.   
180 Id.   
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been the transfer of meaningful appeals on the merits from the BIA to 
the federal courts.   
It seems the streamlining procedure allows the BIA to probe less 
thoroughly into the merits of an asylum case and the corresponding IJ 
opinion.  Indeed, the streamlining regulations have largely eliminated 
the BIA’s de novo review of factual issues “by establishing ‘the 
primacy of the immigration judges as factfinders’ and requiring the 
Board to defer to the Immigration Judge unless a decision is ‘clearly 
erroneous.’”181  Further, the affirmance without opinion portion of the 
regulations allows a single Board member to affirm even if there are 
harmless or nonmaterial errors within that opinion.182  Given the large 
number of appeals filed with the BIA, there may be an inherent 
temptation to characterize flaws in the analysis of an immigration 
judge as harmless in an effort to reduce the number of docketed cases 
at both the IJ and BIA level.  In addition, the removal of immigration 
judges who represent a broader ideological and cultural base may strip 
the BIA of the benefits of more rigorous judicial debate.  Thus, the 
reduction of the number of BIA members, coupled with the 
streamlining system, may seriously hamper the “filtering process” 
which the BIA as an appellate entity represents.183  Therefore, 
erroneous IJ decisions that would normally have been reversed and 
remedied by the BIA now slip through to the Seventh Circuit and other 
federal courts where these opinions garner heavy criticism.184     
                                                 
181 Schoenholtz, supra note 176, at 355 (citing Board of Immigration Appeals: 
Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,881 
(Aug. 26, 2002)).   
182 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2005).   
183 Although, as the Seventh Circuit has noted, this may not ultimately 
prejudice an asylum applicant since meaningful review will be provided on some 
level.  See Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1058 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Georgis 
v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2003).  Yet, asylum applicants (1) must pay 
additional court filing fees if forced to appeal to federal circuit courts, (2) must wait 
additional time periods for resolution of their claims in the federal circuit courts, and 
(3) undoubtedly would benefit from the full application of DOJ-sponsored BIA 
review prior to entering the federal circuit court arena.   
184 See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).   
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The DOJ disagrees with these conclusions, instead attributing the 
rise in the number of federal court appeals to an increased processing 
time for appeals and motions within the BIA, which then prompts an 
alien to appeal an adverse decision in order to stave off deportation as 
long as possible.185  However, this seems a rather simplistic and ill-
supported explanation, as aliens have long resorted to appeals as a 
means of delaying an inevitable deportation and there would thus be 
no reason for a sustained spike in the number of federal appeals.  
Rather, more plausible explanations would be a drop in the quality of 
IJ analysis, a less probing BIA, and a decrease in the physical number 
and ideological diversity of BIA members.  These explanations are 
supported by the high rate of reversal in immigration appeals noted by 
the Seventh Circuit.186
It is evident that the problem here is the procedural design 
implemented by the DOJ.  What then can be done to remedy the 
effects of the streamlining process?  The most obvious answer would 
be to restore or increase the number of BIA members reviewing 
immigration appeals.  This would allow the BIA to again provide 
meaningful review of IJ decisions and thus alleviate the burdens 
placed on the federal courts.  Since aliens are often required to exhaust 
their administrative options before proceeding to federal court, those 
options should at least have some teeth in their review.187  In addition, 
restoring meaningful BIA review would spare the DHS and the DOJ 
from the national exposure and embarrassment that accompany those 
IJ opinions that draw public ire and the wrath of the federal courts.  
Alternatively, the elimination of the affirmance without opinion 
provision may force the BIA to delve more thoroughly into the merits 
of the decision it reviews.  By forcing the BIA to address the analysis 
of IJ decisions, the BIA may think twice about the rationality of the 
conclusions contained therein.   
                                                 
185 U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA 
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr. 
26, 2006).   
186 See Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829.     
187 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2005).    
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Although the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged the 
constitutionality of the streamlining procedures,188 the high rate of 
reversals issued in the Court’s last term indicate that the Seventh 
Circuit is forced to suffer the adverse effects of these procedures.  The 
Seventh Circuit often provides the first meaningful substantive review 
of asylum denials and is therefore forced to confront problems 
concerning credibility and corroboration, those rampant in the Court’s 
recent opinions, head on.  The streamlining procedures thus 
compound, and possibly create, several of the prime errors upon which 
many of the Seventh Circuit’s reversals are based.  To this end, 
eliminating the streamlining procedures will aid in alleviating the high 
rate of asylum adjudication reversals issued by the Seventh Circuit.   
 
C. Is the Immigration Judiciary Too Homogeneous? 
 
Another problem inherent in the immigration system could be a 
lack of diversity amongst immigration judges.  Does the court lack 
enough diversity to properly address cultural diversity?  Or is that just 
a red herring?  Attorneys and legal scholars have attributed some of 
the inappropriate decisions and behavior exhibited by IJs to racial or 
ethnic bias and a lack of cultural sensitivity.189  A recent Los Angeles 
Times article, citing government records, noted that “of the 224 
immigration judges in the U.S., 166 are white, 26 African American, 
22 Latino, nine Asian and one Native American.”190   
It would be thoroughly discouraging to imply that a lack of racial 
or ethnic diversity as an explanation for subpar immigration judge 
analysis warrants merit, as these individuals are fully licensed legal 
practitioners and adjudicators charged with interpreting and applying 
the laws of the U.S.191  If it were to be assumed that the racial or 
ethnic biases of our immigration judges were impeding a fair 
                                                 
188 See Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 966-67 (7th Cir. 2003).   
189 Ann M. Simmons, Some Immigrants Meet Harsh Face of Justice, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at A18.    
190 Id.     
191 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(l) (2003).   
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application of our immigration laws, the entire legacy of the open arms 
of the U.S. would be lost.  Yet, it still remains a distinct possibility for 
error and one that would be extremely difficult to verify or 
substantiate.     
Furthermore, an expansion of races and ethnicities in the 
immigration courts and BIA would not necessarily translate to an 
expanded cultural base.  Several of the problems discussed in this 
Comment stem from American cultural context as a whole, which is 
comprised on nearly every ethnic background.192  Thus, adding more 
ethnicities pulled from a generalized (at least in theory) American 
cultural existence would not necessarily provide a much more diverse 
cultural context, thus not providing a more evenhanded and acute 
application of our immigration laws.   
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the DOJ would be able to 
recruit or obtain a meaningful number of United States citizen 
attorneys haling natively from foreign countries in order to represent a 
broader cultural base within our immigration judiciary.  Nor could we 
assume that an immigration judge born, raised, or culturally steeped in 
a foreign country would not then simply apply that judge’s own 
cultural context, thus favoring or disfavoring certain aliens depending 
upon that foreign country’s cultural tendencies.   
This does give rise to an interesting possibility though.  Should 
the government attempt to regionalize the geographic or cultural areas 
in which certain IJs practice?  That is to say, should immigration 
judges be charged with adjudicating asylum applications for a limited 
and prescribed number of countries?  Presumably, an IJ charged solely 
with adjudicating asylum claims (without reference to the adjudication 
of non-asylum claims) from a geographic region such as the South 
Pacific would be able to familiarize himself of herself more 
thoroughly with the current political and social conditions, the cultural 
backgrounds of people native to the countries in that area, and perhaps 
even the languages to some extent.  This would likely have a profound 
effect on the accuracy of credibility determinations and demeanor 
interpretations, and may offer valuable insight to immigration 
                                                 
192 See supra Parts III.A.1-2.     
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adjudicators on when and where they should reasonably expect 
corroborating documentation.   
Yet there are problems in this scenario as well.  Governments rise 
and fall and wars come and go.  At any one point in history, 
disproportionate numbers of refugees seek asylum from different 
corners of the world.193  Conflicts today may generate a large number 
of refugees from a certain country that might stabilize and produce no 
refugees in the near future.  If the United States Government were to 
focus asylum adjudications by region with correspondingly specialized 
IJs, it is plausible that at certain periods many IJs will have no asylum 
applications on their dockets while others are overwhelmed with an 
influx of applications from one geographic area.  Moreover, venue 
would pose a problem in this scenario too.  Often refugees and asylum 
applicants have little or no money upon entering the United States.  It 
would be impracticable and unreasonable to require an applicant to 
travel across the country in order to have his or her application 
adjudicated by a specialized IJ.  Yet, this problem could possibly be 
remedied by simply creating specialized immigration judges within 
each DOJ Immigration Court.194  Therefore, despite the procedural 
difficulties inherent with the implementation of geographically 
regionalized immigration judges, the benefits afforded by this concept 
may be worth contemplating its realization in the future.   
Although the racial and ethnic constituency of the immigration 
court is not a beacon of diversity, it is not entirely homogeneous 
                                                 
193 See Department of State - Department of Homeland Security - Department 
of Health and Human Services, Report to Congress: Proposed Refugee Admissions 
for Fiscal Year 2005, available at  
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36228.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).    
194 As of April, 2006, there were 51 U.S. DOJ Immigration Courts located 
throughout the following States:  Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.  United States Department of 
Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).   
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either.195  Broad racial divisions such as white, black, and Asian may 
encompass literally hundreds of different ethnicities and cultures.  
However, increased diversity is always a goal to strive towards.  Yet a 
system in which immigration adjudicators remain mindful of the 
myriad variety of cultural and ethnic backgrounds in the claims before 
them is a system that can be successful in an evenhanded and fair 
application of our immigration laws.   
The problematic areas of streamlining, guidance to immigration 
judges, and diversity amongst immigration adjudicators all represent 
procedural policies, both explicit and implicit, of the DOJ.196  
However, all of these problems could be remedied without a serious 
restructuring of the existing adjudicatory process.  The recent 
streamlining regulations can be repealed, thus reforming a larger and 
more diverse BIA, which reviews all IJ decisions by panel with an 
accompanying opinion.  More comprehensive guides and regulations 
concerning credibility determinations and other subjective analysis can 
be enacted and a concerted effort can be made to broaden the racial 
and ethnic composition of the immigration judge pool.  Although the 
Seventh Circuit has not specifically addressed these procedural policy 
issues, the role of the judiciary is not to critique the policy reasons that 
may form the basis for common immigration adjudication errors,197 
but simply to correct those errors that come before the courts.  Yet, the 
Seventh Circuit may ultimately prompt the DOJ to take the Court’s 
considerations into account through the use of systematic, but valid, 
reversals.198   
 
V. IS THE PROBLEM REALLY AS BAD AS IT SEEMS? 
                                                 
195 Ann M. Simmons, Some Immigrants Meet Harsh Face of Justice, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at A18.      
196 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2005) (concerning streamlining procedure and the 
appointment of BIA Board Members by the Attorney General); 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(d)(1) (2005) (concerning adjudication procedures set down by the Attorney 
General).   
197 Although it seems the Seventh Circuit has taken certain liberties with this 
principle.  See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005).   
198 Id.     
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Many of the problems identified by the Seventh Circuit during its 
last term are acknowledged by federal circuit courts across the 
nation.199  The Seventh Circuit’s opinions provide examples of how 
these problems, those such as cultural bias and skepticism, manifest 
themselves in asylum cases.200  At the same time the Court’s opinions 
are often indicative of the manner in which it believes these problems 
should be remedied.201  A majority of the problems discussed in this 
Comment are touched upon, whether expressly or implicitly, by recent 
Seventh Circuit decisions and thus are problems that play a large part 
in the asylum adjudication process.202  Yet, the Seventh Circuit as a 
court of law is bound by the application of the appropriate standards of 
review and reverses cases only when the law dictates they must.  
However, the Court can attempt to shift the policies of immigration 
adjudication through persistent reversal and biting language; at least to 
the extent that proper application of the law allows.  But to what extent 
can the Seventh Circuit actually begin to change immigration policy?  
Certainly the Court has the ability to interpret the meaning of statutes 
and regulations that Congress, the DHS, and the DOJ promulgate.203  
But can the Seventh Circuit provide the impetus for a policy shift?   
  As noted, between June 15, 2005 and December 15, 2005, the 
Seventh Circuit granted a petition to review or reversed the decision of 
the BIA in nearly two-thirds of its published decisions.204  This high 
rate of reversal is certainly discomforting and has obtained the 
attention of the government and the general public as will be discussed 
below.  Yet, could this simply be a strategy contrived by the Seventh 
Circuit and other federal circuit courts designed to provide change?  
                                                 
199 See id. at 829.   
200 See, e.g., Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Dong v. 
Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2005). 
201 See generally Tabaku, 425 F.3d 417; Dong, 421 F.3d 573.   
202 See, e.g., Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005); Zen Li Iao v. 
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005).   
203 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).   
204 See supra note 6.   
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There exists a school of thought on “selective publishing” in which 
courts choose to publish only those opinions that further preordained 
goals.205  Judges exercise considerable discretion, even under a court’s 
publication guidelines, in deciding which opinions should be prepared 
or published, and thus, which decisions become laws.206  Although it 
may take a concerted effort from several judges, it is entirely plausible 
that this strategy could be utilized to draw attention to, and instigate 
reform in, certain problematic areas of law.   
For example, note the high rate of reversal in recent asylum 
opinions published by the Seventh Circuit.207  However, during the 
contemporaneous period in unpublished decisions the Seventh Circuit 
denied petitions for review in 22 out of 24 appeals; results nearly polar 
opposite those of the published opinions.208  This represents an 
astounding contrast.   
                                                 
205 See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They 
Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial 
Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 757, 785-90 (1995).   
206 See id at 790.   
207 See supra note 6.   
208 Cases in which the petition was granted: Kiggundu v. Gonzales, 151 Fed. 
App’x 481 (7th Cir. 2005); Huang v. Gonzales, 139 Fed. App’x 753 (7th Cir. 2005).   
Cases in which the petition was denied: Miron v. Gonzales, 159 Fed. App’x 
731 (7th Cir. 2005); Siqeca v. Gonzales, 157 Fed. App’x 912 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Zagorcani v. Gonzales, 145 Fed. App’x 184 (7th Cir. 2005); Feto v. Gonzales, 148 
Fed. App’x 559 (7th Cir. 2005); Zheng v. Gonzales, 155 Fed. App’x 913 (7th Cir. 
2005); Weng v. Gonzales, 155 Fed. App’x 927 (7th Cir. 2005); Ponomareva v. 
Gonzales, 156 Fed. App’x 845 (7th Cir. 2005); Zheng v. Gonzales, 156 Fed. App’x 
830 (7th Cir. 2005); Zhang v. Gonzales, 154 Fed. App’x 520 (7th Cir. 2005); Chen 
v. Gonzales, 152 Fed. App’x 528 (7th Cir. 2005); Tchoukreeva v. Gonzales, 150 
Fed. App’x 570 (7th Cir. 2005); Agraja v. Gonzales, 152 Fed. App’x 524 (7th Cir. 
2005); Bah v. Gonzales, 143 Fed. App’x 709 (7th Cir. 2005); Caushi v. Gonzales, 
147 Fed. App’x 603 (7th Cir. 2005); Loli v. Gonzales, 147 Fed. App’x 598 (7th Cir. 
2005); Lin v. Gonzales, 140 Fed. App’x 621 (7th Cir. 2005); Malik v. Gonzales, 137 
Fed. App’x 916 (7th Cir. 2005); Li v. Gonzales, 135 Fed. App’x 881 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Zhang v. Gonzales, 136 Fed. App’x 930 (7th Cir. 2005); Ni v. Gonzales, 134 Fed. 
App’x 977 (7th Cir. 2005); Stermolli v. Gonzales, 134 Fed. App’x 970 (7th Cir. 
2005); Kebe v. Gonzales, 134 Fed. App’x 966 (7th Cir. 2005).   
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Perhaps the Seventh Circuit became tired of wading through 
irrational immigration decisions.  Perhaps the Court responded to the 
transplantation of the BIA’s docket to its own.209  Or perhaps this is 
solely coincidence and there is no agenda or implicit meaning behind 
the numbers.  It is true that the period reviewed for this Comment 
represents only a six-month window of Seventh Circuit decisions.  Yet, 
the striking disparity between the reversal rates in published versus 
unpublished opinions, coupled with the Seventh Circuit’s biting 
criticism in the published opinions seems to convey a stern message to 
the DHS and the DOJ that this system needs to be remedied.  To that 
end, it appears that the message has been received.   
 
VI. CHANGE IS IN THE AIR 
 
In recent opinions the Seventh Circuit and the federal circuit 
courts of appeals have demonstrated a rising impatience with 
immigration judges and the BIA’s pattern of serious misapplication of 
elementary adjudication principles in asylum cases.210  It appears that 
these opinions have not fallen on deaf ears.  A front-page column on 
the New York Times’ December 26, 2005 issue bore the headline 
“Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases.”211  The article 
addresses the sharp criticism levied on immigration judges from 
federal circuit courts across the nation while quoting language from 
the recent Seventh Circuit decision Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales.212  The 
                                                 
209 U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA 
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures, (Dec. 8, 2004 revised), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BIAStreamlining120804.pdf (last visited Apr. 
26, 2006).   
210 See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).   
211 Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1.   
212 Id. (quoting Zen Li Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-35 (7th Cir. 2005),  
immigration judges’ “lack of familiarity with relevant foreign cultures” was 
“disturbing,” and the BIA often affirmed “either with no opinion or with a very 
short, unhelpful, boilerplate opinion even when” the immigration judge had 
committed “manifest errors of fact and logic.”).   
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article notes that the gravity of these statements is amplified by their 
issuance from courts known for their “temperate language.”213  It 
further cites to recent immigration opinions issued by several circuit 
court judges which address the inadequacy of the current situation and 
suggest that more thorough review be reinstated at the BIA level.214  
DOJ officials respond and caution against drawing conclusions, 
denying that a serious problem exists.  They note that nearly 300,000 
matters are handled by IJs yearly and the negative opinions cited 
represent a small minority of decisions issued.215  Yet, despite the 
disparity in positions between these entities it appears the United 
States Government has taken stock. 
On January 9, 2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales issued a 
Memorandum to Immigration Judges and a Memorandum to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals that appear to have been prompted by recent 
federal circuit court decisions and the accompanying public outcry.216  
In both memoranda Gonzales stated that he “has watched with concern 
the reports of immigration judges who fail to treat aliens appearing 
before them with appropriate respect and consideration and who fail to 
produce the quality of work that I expect from employees of the 
Department of Justice.”217  According to these memoranda the Deputy 
Attorney General and Associate Attorney General have been instructed 
to develop a comprehensive review of the immigration courts, 
including the quality of work and procedural manners of both 
immigration judges and the BIA.218  Gonzales concluded the 
                                                 
213 Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1.    
214 Id.   
215 See id.   
216  Human Rights First, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales: Memorandum to 
Immigration Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-
ag-memo-ijs.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006); Human Rights First, Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales: Memorandum to Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-
memo-bia.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).     
217 See supra note 216.    
218 Id.   
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memoranda by noting that while not all aliens will be entitled to the 
relief they seek, they are entitled to courtesy and respect from “the 
face of American justice.”219
The Seventh Circuit and the federal circuit courts of appeals 
should view the issuance of these memoranda as a success.  The 
Seventh Circuit stood its ground in a rising tide of immigration 
adjudication incompetence through the use of both a high, yet 
validated, level of reversals and harsh criticism designed to underscore 
the prevalent problems hindering proper adjudication.220  These 
problems appear to be based in part on erroneous subjective analyses 
performed by immigration judges and the BIA.221  Yet, under the 
newly enacted provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005, it appears 
these problems may only become amplified and endorsed by the DOJ 
and the DHS.222  Therefore, in order for the critiques of the Seventh 
Circuit to truly remedy the problems identified, the DOJ must 
scrutinize the possible ramifications these new provisions may bring 
when applied by the current immigration adjudicatory bodies.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is evident that the asylum adjudicatory process administered by 
the immigration courts and the BIA remains flawed.  Recurring and 
widespread errors manifest themselves throughout the asylum 
application process, often resulting in unjust asylum denials.  The 
Seventh Circuit has consistently demonstrated its concern with the 
quality of adjudicatory analysis conducted by the DHS and the 
DOJ,223 noting, “the adjudication of these cases at the administrative 
                                                 
219 Id.   
220 See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005); See 
generally Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2005); Soumahoro v. 
Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005);  Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 
2005).   
221 See supra Parts III.A.4, III.B.3.   
222 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).   
223 See Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829.     
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level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”224  
Although the identification of recurring errors is a step in the right 
direction, it may be difficult to remedy the system given that these 
errors represent both procedural flaws such as streamlining and a lack 
of proper DOJ guidance, as well as flaws inherent to immigration 
adjudicators themselves such as cultural indifference, bias, and 
impartial subjective claim analysis.225   
However, in its recognition of fundamental flaws within the 
immigration adjudication context, the Seventh Circuit has made clear 
which entities it believes can begin remedying this situation:    
 
[w]hether [the unacceptable quality of adjudication] is 
due to resource constraints or to other circumstances 
beyond the Board’s and the Immigration Court’s 
control, we do not know, though we note that the 
problem is not of recent origin . . . [a]ll that is clear is 
that it cannot be in the interest of the immigration 
authorities, the taxpayer, the federal judiciary, or 
citizens concerned with the effective enforcement of the 
nation’s immigration laws for removal orders to be 
routinely nullified by the courts, and that the power of 
correction lies in the [DHS], which prosecutes removal 
cases, and the [DOJ], which adjudicates them in its 
Immigration Court and [BIA].226   
 
The Seventh Circuit correctly recognized the existence of 
fundamental problems in the current status of asylum adjudications, 
and immigration adjudications as a whole.  The Court has also 
correctly taken a firm stance concerning the problems identified, 
reversing immigration judge and BIA decisions at a disproportionately 
                                                 
224 Id. at 829-30 (citing Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2004)).   
225 See supra Part III.A.2.   
226 Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 830 (citing, Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th 
Cir. 2000)).   
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high rate.227  The number of reversals and the harsh criticisms leveled 
on immigration adjudicators within these reversals appears designed to 
bring these issues to the attention of those capable of addressing them; 
to wit: the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of 
Justice.   
In addition, the Seventh Circuit has provided express and implicit 
remedies for many of the problems identified throughout its opinions, 
although the Court is limited in its ability to dole out unsolicited 
advice as an impartial judiciary.  However, it initially appears the 
Seventh Circuit’s suggestions were not given due credence as recent 
legislative enactments such as the REAL ID Act of 2005 may serve to 
actually exacerbate many of the common problems recognized by the 
Court as opposed to remedying them.228  Nevertheless, the Seventh 
Circuit may yet induce positive changes within the immigration 
adjudication system given Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’ recent 
announcement of a comprehensive review concerning the consistent 
failings and incompetence of immigration adjudicators.229  Perhaps 
this review may ultimately result in the application of principles the 
Seventh Circuit has long espoused through its opinions, although only 
time will tell.  However, until the DHS and the DOJ actually take 
proactive and concrete steps to address the problems identified by the 
Seventh Circuit, the Court may be forced to continue reversing poorly 
adjudicated administrative asylum decisions at a disproportionately 
high rate.   
                                                 
227 Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 829.     
228 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 § 101 (2005).   
229 See supra note 216.   
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